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The history of the JFS dispute 
 
JFS (formerly the Jews‟ Free School) is publicly-funded and designated as a Jewish faith school. It is 
oversubscribed; and part of its oversubscription policy has been to give precedence to children 
recognised as Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi (OCR). The OCR only recognises someone as 
Jewish if it recognises that person‟s mother as Jewish („matrilineal descent‟) or if he or she has 
undertaken a qualifying course of Orthodox conversion. That said, however, „The culture and ethos of 
the school is Orthodox Judaism. But there are many children at JFS whose families have no Jewish 
faith or practice at all‟.
2
 
 
E and his son M are practising Masorti Jews. Masortis describe their faith as „traditional Judaism 
practised in a spirit of open-minded enquiry and tolerance. Masorti Judaism accepts the binding force 
of Jewish law, and understands that it has developed throughout history‟.
3
 Like Liberal and Reform 
Judaism, Masorti is not part of the Orthodox Jewish structure headed by the United Synagogue and 
the OCR. E is recognised as Jewish by the OCR; but his wife, originally a Roman Catholic, converted 
to Judaism under the auspices of a non-Orthodox synagogue and her conversion is not recognised by 
the OCR. Therefore, the OCR does not regard M as Jewish because it does not regard his mother as 
Jewish and, accordingly, JFS refused to admit M to the school. 
 
Initially, E appealed to the Schools Adjudicator,
4
 who upheld his complaint in relation to the school‟s 
undersubscription criteria (on the basis that it discriminated indirectly on racial grounds) but not in 
relation to the oversubscription criteria – which was the real point at issue, because in recent years 
the school has been continuously oversubscribed. E then appealed unsuccessfully to the 
Administrative Court on various grounds,
5
 the most important of which were that JFS‟s admissions 
policy did not reflect JFS‟s designated religious character, discriminated on racial grounds against 
children whose mothers were not ethnically Jewish, and unlawfully fettered the Governing Body‟s 
discretion. E argued that this discriminated against M directly on grounds of his ethnic origin contrary 
to section 1(1)(a) Race Relations Act 1976 („the 1976 Act‟). Alternatively, the policy was indirectly 
discriminatory and disproportionate. The High Court rejected both principal claims but was 
unanimously reversed by the Court of Appeal, which held that JFS had discriminated against M 
directly on ground of ethnic origin.
6
 JFS then appealed to the Supreme Court.
7
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 The Supreme Court judgments 
 
Nine judges heard the appeal. Overall, the appeal was dismissed by seven to two:
8
 
 
 Lords Phillips, Mance, Kerr and Clarke and Lady Hale held that there had been direct 
discrimination against M on grounds of his ethnic origins. 
 Lord Hope and Lord Walker held that there had been no direct discrimination but that there 
had been unjustifiable and disproportionate indirect discrimination.
9
 
 Lord Rodger and Lord Brown would have allowed JFS‟s appeal in its entirety. 
 
Lord Phillips suggested at the outset that 
 
… there may well be a defect in our law of discrimination. In contrast to the law in many 
countries, where English law forbids direct discrimination it provides no defence of 
justification.
10
 
 
Lord Phillips quoted with approval the membership criteria for an ethnic group set out by Lord Fraser 
of Tullybelton in Mandla v Dowell Lee:
11
 principally: 
 
 a long shared history and cultural tradition, often (but not necessarily) associated with religion, 
together with either a common geographical origin or descent from a small number of 
common ancestors; 
 a common language not necessarily peculiar to the group; 
 a common literature peculiar to the group; 
 a common religion different from those of neighbouring groups or from the general 
community; or 
 being a minority or an oppressed or dominant group within a larger community.
12
 
 
Because all strands of Judaism traditionally focused on matrilineal descent, a child whose father was 
Jewish but whose mother was not would not be considered as Jewish according to Orthodox and 
most non-Orthodox criteria. It was therefore possible to identify two different cohorts: one by the 
Mandla criteria and the other by Orthodox Jewish criteria. In Lord Phillips‟s view, it was the Mandla 
cohort that formed the Jewish ethnic group with what Lord Fraser regarded as the essentials of a long 
shared history and a common cultural tradition of its own. 
 
The man in the street would recognise a member of this group as a Jew, and discrimination 
on the ground of membership of the group as racial discrimination. The Mandla group will 
include many who are in the cohort identified by the Orthodox criteria, for many of them will 
satisfy the matrilineal test. But there will be some who do not.
13
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 Many of the Orthodox cohort would also fall within the Mandla group but many, mostly descended 
from Jewish women who had married out and abandoned Judaism, would not. They would not satisfy 
Lord Fraser‟s two main criteria and might even be unaware that they were Jewish according to the 
Orthodox test.
14
 However, to treat current membership of a Mandla ethnic group as the exclusive 
ground of racial discrimination ignored the fact that the definition of „racial grounds‟ in s 3 of the 1976 
Act included „ethnic or national origins‟. It was clear that the matrilineal test was a test of ethnic origin; 
therefore, 
 
JFS discriminates in its admission requirements on the sole basis of genetic descent by the 
maternal line from a woman who is Jewish, in the Mandla as well as the religious sense. I can 
see no escape from the conclusion that this is direct racial discrimination.
15
 
 
In the circumstances Lord Phillips came to no conclusion on the issue of indirect discrimination. 
 
Lady Hale drew attention to the „but for‟ test in R v Birmingham City Council, ex parte Equal 
Opportunities Commission
16
 and quoted with approval Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead‟s dictum in 
Nagarajan v London Regional Transport
17
 that racial discrimination was not negatived by the 
discriminator‟s motive, intention, reason or purpose in treating another person less favourably on 
racial grounds.
18
 M was rejected because he was not considered to be Jewish according to the 
criteria adopted by the OCR and 
 
[w]e do not need to look into the mind of the Chief Rabbi to know why he acted as he did. If 
the criterion… adopted was… in reality ethnicity-based, it matters not whether he was 
adopting it because of a sincerely held religious belief.
19
 
 
Moreover: 
 
there can be no doubt that [M‟s] ethnic origins were different from those of the pupils who 
were admitted. It was not because of his religious beliefs. The school was completely 
indifferent to these. They admit pupils who practise all denominations of Judaism, or none at 
all, or even other religions entirely, as long as they are halachically Jewish, descended from 
the original Jewish people in the matrilineal line.
20
 
 
In Lady Hale‟s view, there was no doubt that Jewish people were an ethnic group within the meaning 
of the 1976 Act and it was just as unlawful to treat one person more favourably on the ground of 
ethnic origin as to treat another person less favourably.
21
 
 
Lord Mance drew attention to the reference to the best interests of the child in the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child 1989, Article 3 and to the right of parents under Protocol 1 Article 2 ECHR to 
ensure education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical convictions. 
His conclusion was that  
 
                                                 
14
 At 30–31. 
15
 At 46. 
16
 [1989] 1 AC 1155. 
17
 Cited in BAILII as Swiggs & Ors v Nagarajan [1999] UKHL 36. 
18
 At 511. 
19
 At 65. 
20
 At 66. 
21
 At 67 and 68. 
[t]o treat as determinative the view of others, which an applicant may not share, that a child is 
not Jewish by reason of his ancestry is to give effect not to the individuality or interests of the 
applicant, but to the viewpoint… of the school applying the less favourable treatment. That 
does not seem to me either consistent with the scheme or appropriate in the context of 
legislation designed to protect individuals from discrimination.
22
 
 
As to indirect discrimination, Lord Hope held that the school had refused to admit M solely on religious 
grounds and there had therefore been no direct discrimination on racial grounds, because the OCR 
applied a purely religious test to what constituted Jewishness.
23
 However, the admissions policy was 
disproportionate because it „deprived members of the community such as M, who wished to develop 
his Jewish identity, of secondary Jewish education in the only school that is available‟
24
 and there had 
therefore been indirect discrimination. 
 
Lord Rodger, with whom Lord Brown concurred, would have dismissed the appeal in its entirety. His 
view was that the matter was about religion rather than race: moreover, 
 
[t]he majority‟s decision leads to such extraordinary results, and produces such manifest 
discrimination against Jewish schools in comparison with other faith schools, that one can‟t 
help feeling that something has gone wrong.
25
 
 
In Lord Rodger‟s view, because the Governors of JFS had not been asked when applying the 
religious test to consider M‟s ethnic origins and had not in fact done so, they had not discriminated 
against him directly on racial grounds.
26
 As to the possibility of indirect discrimination: 
 
[t]he aim of the School, to instil Jewish values into children who are Jewish in the eyes of 
Orthodoxy, is legitimate. And from the standpoint of an Orthodox school, instilling Jewish 
values into children whom Orthodoxy does not regard as Jewish at the expense of children 
whom Orthodoxy does regard as Jewish would make no sense. That is plainly why the 
School‟s oversubscription policy allows only for the admission of children recognised as 
Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi. I cannot see how a court could hold that this policy is 
a disproportionate means of achieving the School‟s legitimate aim.
27
 
 
Comment 
 
At a conference of the Churches‟ Legislation Advisory Service on 24 February 2010, David Frei, 
Registrar to the London Beth Din and Director of External and Legal Services at the United 
Synagogue, suggested that though JFS had begun with a Liberal convert seeking entry to an 
Orthodox school, its outcome was that all Jewish denominations were affected and had had to amend 
their admissions criteria – so, in one sense, everyone was in a worse position than at the outset. The 
OCR was now looking at religious practice as the entry criterion, as ultra-Orthodox schools had done 
for a long time. The problem, however, was that Jews have never defined themselves by practice: 
and what would happen in those circumstances to non-observant halachically-Jewish children? 
 
                                                 
22
 At 90. 
23
 At 203 and 204. 
24
 At 211. 
25
 At 226. 
26
 At 231–2. 
27
 At 233. 
The Chief Rabbi‟s guidance now contained three elements: 
 
 prayer (which, in effect, was translated as synagogue attendance even though it is perfectly 
possible for an observant Jew to pray anywhere); 
 voluntary work; and 
 study and education. 
 
This last criterion was the easiest since, for example, attendance at a Jewish primary school would 
fulfil that requirement. But a wider question remained about the effect on other services provided for 
Jews and other religious groups. Part V of the 1976 Act currently provides an exemption for charities 
– but, asked Frei, for how long might that continue? In the event of the repeal of that exemption it is 
not difficult to see how the change might begin to impact on other religious charities whose 
beneficiaries are members of specific faith-communities. 
 
It has already been suggested in some quarters that, as well as creating acute problems for Jewish 
schools, the judgment could also have an impact on admissions policies for faith-schools generally. 
The Daily Telegraph reported on 17 December 2009 that lawyers acting for Ed Balls, the Secretary of 
State for Children, Schools and Families, had warned that the judgment „potentially impacts on other 
schools that give preference to members of particular faiths‟ because religion was „closely related‟ to 
ethnic origin. Mr Balls was quoted as saying that he was considering action to allow faith schools in 
England (of which there are some 7,000) to continue selecting along religious lines. 
 
We are going to need to look carefully at the implications of this, and all faith organisations 
will as well. We must make sure that the role of faith schools is properly protected in our state 
education system. Any further steps which have to be taken should only be taken once we 
have studied the judgment.
28
 
 
It is not clear to what extent the judgment will, in fact, impact on faith schools other than those 
operated by the Jewish and Sikh communities, given that they are the only faith-communities that are 
currently regarded as ethnic groups for the purposes of Mandla – but its implications for faith-schools 
generally are by no means clear-cut. 
 
The root of the problem seems to be that there is a conflict between two versions of what each side 
would regard as „common sense‟. The first version is that of Sedley LJ delivering judgment on behalf 
of the Court of Appeal. He concluded that Jews constituted a racial group defined principally by ethnic 
origin and additionally by conversion; therefore, following Mandla, to discriminate against a person on 
the ground that he or someone else was or was not Jewish was to discriminate against that person on 
racial grounds. Moreover: 
 
[i]f for theological reasons a fully subscribed Christian faith school refused to admit a child on 
the ground that, albeit practising Christians, the child‟s family were of Jewish origin, it is hard 
to see what answer there could be to a claim for race discrimination.
29
 
 
But that ducks the question, „Who is a Jew?‟ by equating it, at least by implication, with the question 
„Who is a Christian?‟ However arresting a rhetorical device it might be to stand the problem on its 
head in this way, from a theological perspective it confuses two issues that should be kept quite 
separate. The overwhelming majority of Christians hold that one becomes a Christian not by 
inheritance but by baptism; and a baptised person of Jewish parents is as much a Christian as 
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someone whose family has been Christian since New Testament times.
30
 The whole point of the 
JFS/OCR argument, on the other hand, is precisely that Jewishness is acquired not by general racial 
origins, nor even by religious practice, but specifically by matrilineal descent in accordance with very 
strict criteria. 
 
The second version is Lord Rodger‟s: that the 1976 Act was being used for a purpose that had never 
been contemplated and that „something has gone wrong‟. This may possibly be going too far in the 
opposite direction. If a child of Jewish parents (even if its mother, in the eyes of some Jews, has been 
improperly converted) practises Judaism as he or she understands it and self-identifies as Jewish, it is 
difficult to see how a claim by the child to be ethnically-Jewish for the purposes of the Race Relations 
Act 1976 can be lightly set aside – whatever view the religious authorities might take about his or her 
Jewishness for the purposes of halacha. That said however, it is inconceivable that when it passed 
the Act Parliament could have predicted, still less intended, the outcome in the JFS appeal. 
 
As to the rights of parents under Protocol 1 Article 2 ECHR, in spite of Lord Mance‟s remarks it is not 
clear that those rights necessarily extend to the situation that arose in JFS. Recent Strasbourg 
jurisprudence certainly upholds parents‟ rights to ensure education and teaching in conformity with 
their own religious and philosophical convictions, as well as their right to withdraw their children from 
compulsory religious and moral education that does not accord with those convictions.
31
 But does 
Protocol 1 Article 2 oblige the Government to provide, for example, education in accordance with 
Quaker principles for a single Quaker child living in a village in mid-Wales? Surely the remedy in such 
a case is for the parents to send the child to a Quaker boarding-school – which, under the present 
law, they are perfectly entitled to do. Purely in terms of Protocol 1 Article 2, E‟s remedy could well 
have been to send his son to a school run by the Liberal or Reform movements that would have 
recognised his Jewishness. 
 
A concluding speculation. Nowhere in any of the judgments was the eponymous case mentioned: but 
might it possibly be that the seven judges who dismissed the appeal in whole or in part felt, 
unconsciously at least, that to deny the Jewishness of someone who practised Judaism and who 
together with his parents was recognised as Jewish in his own religious community was simply 
Wednesbury unreasonable?
32
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